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Executive summary
This special report examines transnational, serious and 
organised crime and the harms it causes to Australia’s 
interests. The report aims to encourage a reinvigorated 
discussion among Australians about this critical matter.
The harms include negative impacts upon individuals and 
the community and unfair competition for some legitimate 
businesses. Serious and organised crime—whether 
transnational or domestic—also imposes costs on Australian 
governments and denies them revenue. What’s more, serious 
and organised crime groups acting overseas work against 
Australia’s foreign policy interests and increase risks to 
Australians (and others) who live, invest and travel abroad. 
There’s an urgent need for the Australian community to 
discuss the criminal threats facing it in a more deliberate and 
broader-reaching way.
That’s because dealing with serious and organised crime is 
not a task for government alone: the Australian public and 
business have key roles. After all, consumer demand creates 
illicit markets that serious and organised crime seeks to 
supply. Additionally, the internet is increasing the speed, 
reach and depth of penetration by serious and organised 
crime into the lives of all Australian families and businesses. 
Simply put, you don’t need to go to nightclubs in red-light 
districts to meet organised crime: you need go only as far as 
your computer.
It’s also worth examining better ways to increase the roles of 
non-law-enforcement agencies, business and the community 
in efforts to address serious and organised crime. We should 
bring the full range of social, education, regulatory and 
health instruments into the fight, and subdue the potential 
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of internet-enabled financial crime to damage our current 
and future prosperity. International cooperation in this fight 
is essential, especially given the role of overseas actors in our 
crime challenge.
Other questions need asking too. Would Australians accept 
measures similar to those taken to counter terrorism to 
combat organised crime? Do we have our illicit drug policy 
settings right? Can a truly national approach to seizing 
unexplained wealth be negotiated? Could governments be 
comfortable with judging police performance based on the 
level of harm that’s avoided, rather than metrics such as the 
number of arrests?
Last, is it time to enhance the Commonwealth’s 
system for detecting corruption, so that the actions of 
politicians and their staff, national business entities 
and non-law-enforcement public servants receive 
greater scrutiny? It’s been argued that without better 
arrangements, we simply ‘don’t know what we don’t know’ 
about corruption.
This analysis of the harms caused by serious and 
organised crime prompts ASPI’s Strategic Policing and Law 
Enforcement Program to adopt a research agenda based 
on four key areas of law enforcement: Australian policy and 
organisational responses; information sharing; international 
cooperation; and geopolitical change. One priority for work 
includes identifying ways to promote information sharing 
between governments, businesses and the community about 
serious and organised crime.
Do Australians want more done about 
serious and organised crime?
Serious and organised crime—which is both domestic and 
increasingly transnational—poses real threats to the interests 
of all Australians. This isn’t an idle claim; nor does it aim to 
create moral panic. But it is a real problem.
It’s a problem created, in part, by the community’s 
willingness to use illicit commodities and services—which 
can be as diverse as illicit drugs, counterfeit pharmaceuticals, 
some forms of offshore betting, and online child sexual 
exploitation. This demand creates markets for some 
organised criminals. Other criminal opportunities arise from 
the ability to use the cyber domain, including in areas such as 
illicit goods, fraud and tax evasion, where anonymity makes 
it easier for criminals to succeed.
These acts of commission and omission mean the 
community pays for this threat every day in taxes, higher 
banking charges, internet security, insurance costs and 
healthcare premiums—so why aren’t these matters high in 
the Australian public’s mind? While crime and corruption 
are often issues at state elections (although not at federal 
ones), and a reasonable proportion of the community says 
they feel unsafe due to crime1, serious and organised crime 
is rarely mentioned in surveys about security threats.2 
This should change.
The public’s seeming lack of attention to the challenge 
of serious and organised crime stands in contrast to 
the Australian Government’s actions. A range of official 
documents, from national security strategies to the 
Australian Crime Commission’s periodic public assessments, 
explain the threat from serious and organised crime. As a 
result, Australian Government approaches to countering 
it are reasonably broad and innovative, and resources are 
devoted to major criminal cases. But can governments 
do more? Is there room for even greater cooperation 
between the Australian Government and its state and 
territory counterparts? Are more resources needed to 
disrupt organised crime? Are there better ways to increase 
participation by non-law-enforcement agencies, businesses 
and the community in efforts to address serious and 
organised crime?
This special report aims to encourage a new public discussion 
about transnational, serious and organised crime, its 
harms, and what Australians should be doing about it. After 
examining the main harms that serious and organised crime 
causes to Australia’s interests, the paper poses some key 
questions to the community, business and government. The 
questions focus on public awareness, information exchanges, 
national approaches, anticorruption, and the assets available 
to fight against organised crime, including international 
cooperation and capacity building. The report concludes 
with four research focus areas for ASPI’s Strategic Policing 
and Law Enforcement Program.
This report is based on interviews with representatives of 
18 major business and peak industry bodies, 16 Australian 
Government and state and territory agencies, two 
international agencies, and 22 academics and other experts. 
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It was written at the same time that work to update estimates 
of the cost of serious and organised crime in Australia 
was conducted, which is likely to show that these costs 
are greater than currently understood. This report makes 
extensive use of open-source research by the Australian 
Institute of Criminology, Australian and overseas law 
enforcement agencies, and private companies that conduct 
research in areas such as fraud and corruption, but there’s 
sure to be more to the picture than is provided here.
So, despite the evidence available—and because of its 
limitations—it’s not possible to quantify the level of harm 
that serious and organised crime imposes upon Australian 
interests (counting costs is a different but still complex 
matter). Yet it’s possible to identify the breadth of harms and 
often their overall significance to Australia, and so encourage 
the public to think more critically about how serious and 
organised crime affects Australians’ everyday lives. It’s 
also possible to identify a number of key questions that the 
public, business and government should ask themselves and 
each other. The report addresses those tasks after defining 
the key subjects.
Defining the web
There are many definitions of serious and organised crime—
around 180, by one count. Some require the presence of an 
ongoing criminal activity that uses methods such as money 
laundering, identity crime, violence, corruption and extortion 
to achieve the criminals’ goals. Others are broader, focusing 
more on the seriousness of the crime. This special report uses 
Australian legal definitions, which means that serious and 
organised crime:
• involves two or more offenders and substantial planning 
and organisation
• usually involves sophisticated methods and technologies 
(but not always)
• involves serious offences that are likely to attract a 
sentence of three years or more, such as theft, illegal 
narcotics dealings, extortion, violence, bribery or money 
laundering—often in conjunction with offences of a 
like kind.
The characteristics of organised crime groups vary—indeed, 
they have recently been described as ‘amorphous’ by ASPI 
analyst John Coyne. There is no single or predominant type 
of group structure; older traditional ‘mafia’ style hierarchies 
are being joined by looser ‘networks’ involving cooperation 
between often disparate and transnational groups operating 
on different parts of the criminal enterprise. The motivation 
for serious and organised criminals is generally personal 
profit, although criminals can be interested in power, 
gratification and self-preservation too. In addition, the 
following factors usually apply:
• Organised crime generally works in illicit markets but it 
exploits legitimate markets too.
• There’s an important financial dimension, particularly 
in efforts to launder money, hide criminal wealth 
through complex structures, attack victims’ financial 
assets or intermingle legitimate trade and business with 
criminal activities. These crimes are often supported 
by ‘professional facilitators’ with legal, accounting or 
financial expertise.
• Violence was once considered a key part of serious 
and organised crime methods but, with the increasing 
prevalence of the cyber environment as a vector and 
target for organised criminal acts and major frauds 
that undermine economic strength, that is not always 
so today.3
Serious and organised crime can be organised and 
perpetrated solely within one country (i.e. ‘domestic’) 
but it’s likely to have overseas, or ‘transnational’, elements 
today. Transnational crime involves criminal groups that 
operate in more than one national jurisdiction, or crimes that 
are prepared in or have effects in more than one national 
jurisdiction. As a result of this transnational trend, it’s 
becoming increasingly difficult to identify the location of the 
source, all possible harms and the responsible jurisdiction 
for serious and organised crime. So, while the transnational 
element needs to be highlighted, this report sticks with the 
term ‘serious and organised crime’ for simplicity’s sake.
Serious and organised crime is a significant threat to national 
security in many countries. In places like Mexico, crime 
groups challenge the central government directly and often 
penetrate smaller regional or municipal governments. In 
places like Afghanistan, organised crime groups—which 
might appear as insurgencies or terrorist groups—create 
no-go areas and act as an illegitimate government.4
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While those conditions don’t pertain to Australia, the 
Australian Government also describes serious and organised 
crime as a threat to national security. That’s because it 
undermines our economy, infringes border integrity and 
sovereignty, damages prosperity and regional stability, and 
erodes political and social institutions. So, while the threat 
to Australia’s security is there, it’s also possible to describe 
serious and organised crime’s detrimental effect on business 
and individuals in ways that are better covered by the 
broader concept of ‘interests’.
Interests are somewhat subjective and difficult to define. 
When trying, it’s usual to look for conditions that are 
important for a long period, even if they can’t be achieved 
all the time. Some ‘national interests’, such as sovereignty 
and border integrity, are indisputable because they are 
key conditions of being a state. Most societies have an 
interest in their long-term economic strength and a cohesive 
population. Similarly, democratic states have a considerable 
interest in protecting individual people and businesses, 
and aspire to do so at home and abroad. Because states are 
themselves part of an international community, most of them 
consider a stable international environment to be in their 
interest. While their means of achieving this stability—and the 
extent of turmoil they are prepared to tolerate—may differ, 
most see a degree of confidence in international dealings as 
important for commerce, travel and security.
Individual and business interests are difficult to define in 
ways that apply in all cases, but generalisation is possible. 
In Australia, these interests usually include participation 
in a democratic system, and extend to the maximisation of 
outcomes, be they personal or economic. Interests include 
freedom from danger and arbitrary coercion, and often 
extend to human and legal rights. Sometimes, interests 
extend to the collective, which is why consideration of the 
national interest is important.
Harm is another key concept, which is defined here as an 
outcome of an act that violates a legal or innate right. Put 
simply, harms have negative impacts that are ‘bad’ for society 
and are something to be controlled.5 While that distinction 
can be clear, the effect or level of harm is usually variable. 
Some activities cause great harm, perhaps because of their 
scale or the place where they occur, while others cause less. 
Apportioning a degree of harm to each crime is a similarly 
complex business, and often involves a calculation of 
seriousness, cost and impact on victims.6 That task is beyond 
the scope of this paper. Still, it is a useful way to describe what 
the effects of serious and organised crime mean for Australians.
A wide range of criminal actions (and actors) could cause 
harms, and it can be hard to use statistics and reporting to 
isolate those caused by serious and organised crime from those 
caused by other crimes and perpetrators. So this report focuses 
on areas where harm is clearly caused by serious and organised 
crime. Harms that are often attributed to serious and organised 
crime, but can also be perpetrated by others, are mentioned 
to enhance the picture of the impact of serious and organised 
crime on the Australian community. That qualification 
introduces an element of uncertainty into the report’s analysis, 
but it’s still important to undertake this work. That’s because 
serious and organised crime engages our international 
obligations, is relevant at the national and international levels, 
and has links to other types of crime, including ‘white collar’ 
crime, and to terrorism and insurgency.7
It’s also hard to quantify many harms and costs of crime. 
Criminologist Russell Smith identified many such difficulties, 
which include definitions, data holdings and attributions of 
harms and costs.8 It can be difficult to estimate the full effect 
of the ‘dark market’ of crime—you just can’t count it. Adding to 
this complexity, harms can cause direct and indirect problems 
for different groups. That means this qualitative study can, at 
best, illustrate the breadth of harms, while other studies using 
different methods are better suited to study its depth through 
economic analysis. It also means that this report leaves an 
important task—prioritising harms—to later work.
When the concepts of harm, interests and serious and 
organised crime are overlaid (Figure 1), a picture of their 
relationship emerges in the form of a web. In the centre of 
the diagram are the typical enabling methods of serious 
and organised crime. The enablers are used to conduct the 
criminal activities and so attack and produce harms for the 
five identified interests (in the circles). These harms are shown 
around the outside (in bold) in summary form, and provide 
the organising structure for the discussion that follows. 
Note too that other manifestations of crime—interpersonal 
violence or volume crime, such as theft—can create some 
similar effects. In order to provide more fidelity to the 
analysis, selected actions or threats are also shown.
The following sections briefly explain these harms—and 
why they affect the individual and collective interests of 
all Australians.
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Figure 1:  The harms posed by serious and organised crime to Australian interests
Sources: Australian Crime Commission, EUROPOL, ASPI, RUSI (UK)
The harms caused by serious and 
organised crime
There is a mismatch between the public’s perceptions of 
serious and organised crime (as revealed in surveys) and the 
Australian Government’s view (as displayed by its actions). 
This section explores the reasons why the public and 
business should be more concerned by examining five key 
harms that serious and organised crime poses for their, and 
the nation’s, interests.
Personal and community harms to Australians
Most Australians are aware of the insidious, predatory and 
greed-driven nature of serious and organised crime and the 
harms that it poses to individuals. Those harms are often 
caused by other Australians, although the transnational 
dimension of serious and organised crime means that 
harms will be generated from overseas too. The harm can 
affect people who come into direct contact with criminal 
enterprises, particularly where that might make them more 
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likely to suffer violence or economic loss, but many more 
Australians will feel harm indirectly.
Harms to individuals and families
Drugs are a good example of the harms caused to individuals 
and families by serious and organised crime, and of 
the complexity of the harm that’s caused. According to 
Australian research:
• 15% of Australians aged 14 years and over used illicit 
drugs in 20139
• about 8% of the community have drug-related disorders
• perhaps 1,000 die each year from illicit drugs10
• each year, 3% physically experience the consequences of 
a drug-related incident11
• pharmaceutical drugs, when abused or provided illegally, 
are another source of harm
• while the relationships are complex, drug use may be 
involved in family-based violence, illnesses such as HIV/
AIDS, and social dysfunction12
• driving under the influence of drugs is being detected 
more often, and drugs are a contributor to 11% of fatal 
road crashes in New South Wales13
• national illicit drug reporting consistently places 
marijuana as the most consumed drug in Australia, as 
well as the drug most likely to feature in arrests.14
Serious and organised crime (as an enterprise) is at the centre 
of the illicit drugs market in Australia. This is demonstrated 
by the numbers: 93,000 seizures, 27 tonnes of substances 
and 110,000 arrests in 2013–14.15 Given the scale of the illicit 
drug market and the complexity of running it, it’s fair to 
attribute a significant amount of health and criminal harms 
to this activity.
Serious and organised crime gangs also play a major part in 
the illicit market for restricted firearms in Australia. According 
to criminologist Samantha Bricknell, such groups—especially 
outlaw motorcycle gangs—are the main traders of illicit 
firearms, and around 62% of the 2,750 firearms seized by 
police between 2002 and 2011 were possessed by serious and 
organised crime gangs.16 Naturally, that’s a small proportion 
of the estimated 260,000 illegal firearms in Australia, but 
it’s an indicator of the importance of serious and organised 
crime in this illicit market. The harms caused by gun crime 
(not all of which can be attributed to organised crime) extend 
to fatalities and to heightened perceptions of danger in 
communities where gun crime is prevalent—even if gun crime 
is falling overall.17
Serious criminal activity also increases the costs borne by 
individuals. Those costs can be created when the losses 
caused by crime are factored into the overall cost of services 
or goods. For example, the cost of insurance fraud adds 
about 10% to premiums, although this cost is not wholly 
attributable to organised crime.18 In other cases, such as 
in some forms of cybercrime, criminals using sophisticated 
techniques are able to reach into individual homes and 
demand money for ‘services’. If the payment—often around 
$60 to $200, but this varies—isn’t made, the owner is usually 
up for much more.19 It’s also possible to impose some costs 
on consumers when government imposes regulations to 
counter crimes such as money laundering. So, while costs 
and perhaps decreased confidence in the internet clearly 
harm individuals, it’s hard to attribute an exact proportion to 
serious and organised crime.
Organised criminals are important perpetrators of identity 
crime, which can impose serious costs (including health 
costs) on individuals. The Australian Institute of Criminology 
found that, while the amounts stolen were often less than 
$1,000 (and averaged around $4,000 per incident), some 
victims experienced mental stress requiring treatment, 
were refused credit, or were accused of a crime.20 Fraud is 
another concern for individuals. Figures 2 and 3 highlight 
these crimes, in addition to others in which people come into 
direct or indirect contact with serious and organised crime 
every day.
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Figure 2:  A focus on identity crime
A 2015 Attorney-General’s Department report indicates that the economic 
impact of identity crime could exceed $1.6 billion per year through 
losses to individuals, businesses and the costs to government 
agencies and the justice system in combating identity crime. 
Identity crime is not necessarily an end in itself, but rather a 
component of other organised criminal activities, such as 
fraud, money laundering or the trafficking of illicit goods. 
The report indicates that the majority of identity 
crime is undetected or unreported, so the 24,000 
prosecutions for identity-related crimes are only 
indicative of the whole picture. However, the 
Australian Institute of Criminology reported in 
2014 that 69% of Australians were extremely 
concerned about identity crime. So there’s 
a disconnect between Australians’ 
concern about identity crime, and 
what we actually do about it when 
we see it.
Prosecuted 
identity 
crimes
Commonwealth: 
Avg. 2,245 prosecutions p.a.
State/territory: 
Avg. 22,000 identity crimes  
proven guilty p.a.
Identity crimes detected by 
police (up to 30,000 p.a.)
Alleged victims of identity crime and misuse 
(estimated 750,000–937,000 alleged victims each 
year in Australia)
Undetected identity crime (unknown)
Source: Identity crime and misuse in Australia, Attorney-General’s Department, online
Figure 3:  Some daily interactions with (or due to) serious and organised crime
Identity theft
Typical cost to 
purchase a new 
identity: 
• driver licence, 
Medicare card and 
phone bill: $500
• Credit card: 
About $80
• Real passport with 
false biodata for 
around $30,000.
Ransomware 
• Typical cost 
to unlock your 
computer: 
$100–1500 
(sometimes in 
‘Bitcoin’) 
• Number of 
ransomware 
attacks in Australia 
each year: 40,000
• Number of 
businesses and 
homes affected 
each year: 16,000
Identity checks
When you go to a bank, 
you must produce 
100 points of identity. 
This measure helps 
institutions to ‘know 
your customer’, and is 
a key part of Australia’s 
anti-money laundering 
system
Cybercrime
• Cost of cybercrime 
to the Australian 
economy each 
year: $1 billion 
(a conservative 
estimate)
• Number of 
cybercrime reports 
each day: 108
Drugs
• 15% of Australians 
aged over 14 years 
used illicit drugs 
in 2013
• 8% of the 
community will 
have drug-related 
disorders
• 11% of fatal road 
crashes involve 
drugs
Sources:
Identity theft: Attorney-General’s Department (C’wealth)
Ransomware: Norton
Identity checks: AUSTRAC
Cybercrime: Australian Cyber Crime Reporting Network
Drugs: National Drug Household Survey, NSW Govt 
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Harms to the community, in whole or in part
It’s hard not to observe that serious and organised 
crime affects some parts of the Australian community 
disproportionately. For instance, areas of lower 
socioeconomic status might be more prone to drugs, 
gangs and violence, the elderly might be targeted for 
superannuation or romance scams, and people traumatised 
by crime in the past might turn to illicit drugs for relief. But 
the harm to the whole community is more than just the 
sum of the impacts on discrete groups, especially where 
serious and organised crime has the ability to corrupt 
community institutions.
Overseas cases that show the influence of crime in sport 
demonstrate this concern.21 While criminologist Samantha 
Bricknell has argued that Australian sport is ‘relatively 
clean’ in terms of crime, she also identified an ‘inevitability 
of infiltration... because of the opportunistic nature of 
sophisticated criminal entities or as illegal betting collectives 
see Australian sport as an increasingly viable venture.’22 
Where penetration does occur, crime harms sport by 
reducing the credibility of the contest and the fairness of 
betting. Where drugs are also involved, there can be harms to 
the health of individual athletes and fairness of the contest. 
So while harm caused today in Australia is not considered 
widespread by interviewees for this project, there’s no 
room for complacency if the Australian community wants to 
maintain healthy sporting competitions as part of its future.23
While not enough to establish a pattern in Australia, there 
have been some recorded instances of criminal groups 
creating significant levels of harm in rural areas. One such 
instance was identified in the Woodward Royal Commission 
of 1979, which documented how organised criminals built 
a major marijuana operation around Griffith in the 1970s. 
That operation corrupted some police and intimidated local 
people.24 In more recent cases, crime groups, particularly 
outlaw motorcycle gangs, operating in areas such as 
country Victoria, allegedly manufacture and sell ‘ice’ (crystal 
methamphetamine). In addition to direct problems of 
violence and coercion, ice creates new challenges by harming 
the health of users in areas where treatment services are less 
available, especially rural areas.25
Visa fraud is another way that serious and organised crime 
creates harm to the community, although it’s currently hard 
to estimate how much. The Australian Crime Commission 
(ACC) first commented on this type of crime in 2015, when 
it noted how organised crime had penetrated the visa and 
migration market, with the potential to create a significant 
threat to Australia’s migration system and security.26 
Some cases linking visa fraud to human trafficking have 
been identified in Australia, including in the sex, services, 
agricultural and construction industries. Newspapers have 
also alleged that insufficient checks on visa applicants, 
including those in the investor and business classes, allow 
some criminals to gain residency and bring their money into 
Australia. We’ve also heard of an instance where prospective 
migrants earn visas based on fraudulent qualifications. This 
crime can allow people to enter even if they haven’t met the 
conditions to work in Australia—some of whom may wish 
to evade law enforcement or accountability in their home 
countries. If taken to an extreme, there’s also the potential 
to harm Australia’s consensus over migration by giving those 
who disagree with it a cause célèbre.
Some types of serious and organised crime have 
environmental impacts. For instance, illegal waste dumping, 
including electronic waste, has been identified as a growing 
concern overseas.27 Wildlife crime, also known as biodiversity 
crime, involves the illegal trade in endangered species of 
flora and fauna. It’s a niche criminal market, and the overall 
harm to the environment is difficult to quantify. But wildlife 
advocacy group ‘Click to Delete’ identified a growing rate of 
illegal wildlife trade by Australian online retailers, estimating 
a 266% increase since 2008. Goods traded included reptile 
products, animal products for medicinal use and live birds 
and reptiles. While Australia’s relatively strong legislation 
governing illegal wildlife trade was praised, increasing ways 
to trade in these goods online present new challenges for 
law enforcement. There’s also potential for greater harm to 
endangered species and the environment.28
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What potential harms can serious and organised crime 
create for people and the community in Australia?
• Health costs and risks, especially from drugs
• Increased costs in areas such as insurance
• Loss of confidence in political and community institutions,
such as visas and sport
• Financial and health costs caused by identity theft
• Potential for coercion and violence by serious and organised
crime groups
• Risks to personal savings and privacy
• Risks to social cohesion through some people’s attraction to
criminal lifestyles
Government and private revenue losses and 
increased costs
Serious and organised crime hampers legitimate 
businesses and deprives governments of revenue 
(with an ultimate impact on the taxpayer). The 
annual cost of such crime to Australia is often cited 
by the ACC as a ‘conservative’ $15 billion per year. 
In an interview for this project, crime economist 
John Walker said that the real cost of criminal 
activity could be much higher. Regardless of the 
economic quantum, serious and organised crime, 
including an increasing cybercrime dimension, 
imposes a significant burden on Australia and a 
real opportunity cost (see Figure 4).
Figure 4:  The opportunity cost of organised crime
Sources: ACC, Government of South Australia, Parliamentary Library
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For business, harm starts with lost competitiveness but 
extends to social harms. These harms might come from a 
criminal competitor who maintains a business as a front to 
launder money or from criminal groups flouting laws. Criminal 
and cartel behaviour, and outright extortion, were cited in 
construction, and some retail trading and service areas.29 This 
makes the criminal penetration of the legitimate economy 
a major concern for law enforcement agencies.30 In social 
terms, the Victorian Law Reform Commission has identified 
general unlawful conduct, threats to safety from that conduct, 
damage to industry integrity, and allowing a seemingly 
‘legitimate’ business to ‘distribute illicit goods to a large 
market’ as the harms arising when serious and organised 
crime infiltrates the legitimate economy.31
Counterfeiting is an example of the latter. This activity is a 
major problem in industries in which luxury or easily copied 
goods are involved, and the list of goods and the volume 
being detected are growing.32 Medicines, sporting goods 
and car parts are possible targets for this crime, creating real 
and serious implications for health and safety. The profits 
of counterfeiting have been known to fund terrorist groups, 
although whether this link is common is harder to determine.
The related challenge of intellectual property (IP) theft 
is another concern for some businesses. This crime can 
take many forms, including the pirating of software, music 
and video products. IP theft can also extend to industrial 
espionage, in which ‘trade secrets’ or data are stolen from 
firms to be on-sold by criminal groups.33 While states or 
state-backed groups might be behind some of this activity, 
organised crime plays a significant role, albeit one difficult 
to quantify and apportion.34 Regardless of the perpetrator, 
industrial espionage and IP theft allow some firms to gain 
an economic advantage by obtaining knowledge that they 
haven’t paid to develop.
Similarly, if goods can avoid taxes and excise when they 
are introduced to the market, sellers have a significant cost 
advantage. Several businesspeople interviewed for this 
report raised this concern about areas as diverse as car 
parts and cigarettes. There’s anecdotal evidence that some 
retailers sell untaxed goods to maintain their businesses 
in the face of criminal competition, or because they’re 
coerced into doing so. Where serious and organised crime 
penetrates a market, perhaps to launder money, honest 
businesses will be squeezed and people may become 
unemployed as a result.35 This means that the penetration 
of serious and organised crime into legitimate business can 
create multiple harms, ranging from the distorting effects 
of unfair competition through to threats to the safety of 
individual businesspeople.
Cybercrime is an increasing threat to business, according to 
the Australian Government. While it’s hard to apportion all 
of this activity to serious and organised crime, it imposes 
reputational, financial, security and remediation costs to 
business. These costs flow onto support for victims from 
governments, but that’s only one dimension of the costs and 
harms borne by taxpayers for this activity.36
Government also imposes regulations in an attempt to 
minimise the harms caused by serious and organised 
crime, and that regulation increases the costs of doing 
business (even if the whole amount is hard to quantify). 
One example is the anti-money-laundering/counterterrorism 
financing (AML/CTF) regime. These are essential measures 
because money laundering can both threaten the integrity 
of the financial system and provide sources of funds for 
criminal groups and terrorists, while denying revenue to 
the government. While per-transaction compliance costs 
associated with the AML/CTF regime are small and difficult 
to measure, regulation still adds to the time and regulatory 
burdens on everyday business.37
While some money-laundering methods, such as the 
manipulation of funds through the financial system, are 
well known (see Figure 5 for a typical example), others, such 
as trade-based money laundering and the use of virtual 
currencies such as Bitcoin, introduce new complexities. As a 
consequence, the different ways of laundering money make 
detection difficult, and constant attention is required by 
government and business. That need can be deduced from the 
64,000 suspicious transaction reports that AUSTRAC received 
last financial year, and from the concerns expressed about the 
role of professional facilitators in assisting these crimes.38
The harm to business can also be seen in the need for 
greater and often more costly measures to protect identities. 
For example, there’ll soon be a need for everyone to 
use sophisticated technologies to safeguard everyday 
transactions. These measures mean that serious and 
organised crime indirectly increases costs in such areas as 
private and internet security, and that it complicates internet 
transactions. The estimated costs of guarding against this type 
of activity tend to vary widely—others have calculated physical 
security costs to counter crime at about $3.4 billion, internet 
security tools and services at $1.9 billion and documentation 
verification at $1.3 million—but how much can be apportioned 
to serious and organised crime is uncertain.39
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Figure 5:  A typical money laundering method
Spotting criminal activity in the economy isn’t always 
clear-cut: there are ‘degrees of dodgy’. The crossover 
between illegitimate and legitimate might be seen where:
• criminal money is eventually cleaned until it looks 
respectable
• products that don’t conform to standards are mingled 
with genuine products
• products are in a ‘grey zone’, such as when tax is avoided 
on genuine goods, or when a legal good is changed so 
that it becomes illicit, such as a replica firearm that’s 
manipulated into a firing version40
• services are purchased based on threats, actual or implied.
Furthermore, some businesses might not identify organised 
crime. In a number of interviews for this report, peak 
associations said that their members are more likely to speak 
of ‘noncompliance’ when talking about how crime influences 
their sectors. It seems that they don’t see or acknowledge the 
network or organisation behind individual acts.
Law enforcement officials are increasingly concerned about 
major economic crime. ‘Old’ crimes, such as fraud, operate 
differently when the cyber domain is exploited, including when 
it enables well-organised criminals to steal from investors and 
institutions.41 This could extend to the penetration of stock 
market systems, according to the head of Australia’s Cyber 
Security Operations Centre, although the public evidence 
for this is very limited. The great pool of Australian wealth 
that’s accumulating in self-managed superannuation funds 
is another concern, especially in cases where not-so-savvy 
investors are conned by criminals. The penetration of that 
pool and the financial sector more generally would have 
a significant impact on all Australians, the economy and 
the government, according to the ACC. While the instances 
noted so far have been at the hundreds of millions of dollars 
level (except perhaps for the Madoff swindle, which involved 
US$19.5 billion), crimes such as the Trio Capital fraud (see box) 
are extremely concerning because they could have a major 
effect on the superannuation system.42
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The numbers affected by fraud are big—1.2 million 
Australians have been affected to some extent, 
40 government agencies have experienced it, and losses total 
around $6 billion annually.43 But it’s hard to know how much 
of this is due to serious and organised crime. What’s known 
is that fraud losses (and recoveries) are increasing, and that 
increasing financial transactions over the internet will be 
likely to increase the risk from serious and organised crime.44
Trio Capital
The ACC estimates that Australian superannuation 
holdings will increase to around $6 trillion by 2035 
(that’s over five times today’s assets). This large 
amount of money, combined with the fact that 
many people don’t access their superannuation for 
a significant period, makes this is a very attractive 
target for serious and organised crime.
The largest Australian case of superannuation fraud 
was the collapse of Trio Capital, in which $176 million 
was lost from two fraudulently managed schemes 
over the period from 2004 to 2009. The fraud occurred 
through the movement of funds into overseas 
jurisdictions. The ACC describes this case as an 
example of sophisticated methodologies employed by 
highly professional organised fraud networks.
Source: Treasury, Review of the Trio Capital fraud and 
assessment of the regulatory framework, 2013.
Higher law enforcement costs and lost tax and excise are 
major monetary harms for governments. In Australia’s case, 
total law enforcement spending is around $14 billion each 
year, including for courts and corrections.45 Costs for other 
relevant agencies and regulators, including the Australian 
Taxation Office, add to this total. While only some of this can 
be apportioned to combating serious and organised crime, 
it’s still a significant opportunity cost for the community. It’s 
more difficult to estimate the amount of tax not collected or 
defrauded, and how much of that’s lost due to organised crime 
is not clear. For example, KPMG has estimated that in 2015 the 
Australian Government lost $1.353 billion in excise due to illicit 
tobacco sales, a 26% increase on 2013.46 While some disagree 
with that estimate, most of any loss would be attributable in 
some way to organised crime, according to an interview for this 
report. When added together, these and related activities are a 
significant cost—albeit incompletely quantifiable and hard to 
apportion—for the Australian Government.
While this report focuses on the direct and verifiable 
economic harms noted above, interviewees posed additional 
questions about harms that tend to have less of an evidence 
base. For instance, can we understand exactly how the 
presence of serious and organised crime might give a suburb 
a ‘bad name’ and discourage new businesses? How can we 
quantify the fear felt by some people, but not others, due to 
gang violence? How can we know when business owners and 
members of the community are forced into silence due to the 
possible repercussions from speaking out? What happens 
when ethnic groups are tainted by association? To take 
some of these questions a step further, do we know when 
these community- and business-level problems can become 
problems for elected representatives, who must respond to 
concerns in some way? While it’s impossible to show this, it’s 
pretty certain that our governments address these concerns 
through spending and regulation.
But can serious and organised crime have some positive 
impacts? While this sounds absurd, organised crime can 
replace governments, especially when the criminals enforce 
contracts and provide ‘security’. Organised crime also fills 
‘denied demand’ in our society—be it for pleasure-providing 
drugs, prostitution, gambling services, pirated software or, 
in some places, organs for transplant. Some argue that the 
‘dark web’ also reduces the harm caused by organised crime, 
as it removes violent ‘middlemen’ from the drug supply 
chain (Figure 6).47 As John Walker notes, criminal investment, 
especially from overseas, is still investment—although it has 
negative effects at the same time, like market distortions and 
reputational risks.48 Organised crime might also make some 
goods cheaper for individuals because costs are spread over 
the entire economy and cheaper versions of the original might 
be produced (if they are of a similar quality, that is).
Despite some of the perceived benefits of organised crime, 
ultimately it hurts all of us, and the nation, in the long term.
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Figure 6:  The dark web
Google only takes users to the very top layer of the internet . What you 
don’t see is a ‘deep web’ that contains other websites and databases, 
including computers and websites that are deliberately anonymised and 
need to be accessed using specific tools. This part is called the ‘dark web’.
The dark web provides an interface for those wishing to trade in illicit 
goods and services, often through ‘marketplaces’ such as the now 
defunct ‘Silk Road’, ‘Silk Road 2.0’, and ‘Agora’. 
Despite high-profile law enforcement action, trade in these dark markets 
continues to grow: the number of drug listings in four of the major 
markets was around 18,000 in October 2013. Within eight months, the 
number of listings was 43,175 in 23 markets.
While law enforcement is fighting back, it’s a tough job. Technologies like 
the anonymising software TOR, ‘Pretty Good Privacy’ encryption, crypto 
currencies like Bitcoin and the relative ease of establishing a dark web 
market make cyber criminals relatively agile and hard to trace.
Tobias Feakin, Underground web: the cybercrime challenge 
(with Callum Jeffray), ASPI, 2015.
What potential harm can serious and organised 
crime create for government and private revenue 
and costs?
• Reduced business competitiveness
• Increased spending, transaction costs and 
regulations
• Erosion of the tax base and imposition of costs for 
enforcement
• Loss of superannuation and other investments
• Potential to distort financial markets
The erosion of Australian sovereignty
The economic harms caused by serious and organised crime 
can also infringe Australia’s sovereignty when crime groups 
challenge the government’s legitimacy and undermine 
public institutions.
The harm is seen clearly at the borders, where serious 
and organised crime constantly challenges the Australian 
Government’s right to control imports and exports. By doing 
so, organised crime compromises biosecurity, evades taxes and 
introduces items that the community wishes to exclude from 
the country. The level of harm is hard to quantify. Customs has 
described the threat of serious organised crime at the border 
as ‘significant’, while the ACC has described related activity 
as being present at most Australian ports and airports. This 
challenge leads the Australian Government to invest around 
$1.4 billion a year in border security (excluding detention 
costs49) and to charge transaction costs for inspections.
There’s an ongoing and increasing concern about links 
between terrorism and organised crime in Australia. These 
links are very prominent in a number of overseas cases, 
and have been known to exist here for some time.50 These 
include, for instance, terrorist or insurgent groups like the 
Afghan Taliban or the Colombian FARC who produce or ship 
drugs that are consumed in Australia.51 The recent situation 
in Syria and Iraq, and changes to terrorist recruiting and 
financing methods, have made such links more prominent 
over the past year. This has included instances of identity 
crime, currency crimes, and some instances of ‘progression’ 
from organised crime to terrorism.52 The ACC is also ‘finding 
strong links with what we would call super-facilitators who 
are offshore based, and these people have direct connections 
with terrorist groups.’53 This might plausibly involve terrorists 
contacting organised criminals to obtain firearms, buy false 
identification or pass money to others. Using public sources, 
it’s hard to know the extent to which this occurs here.
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Despite this limitation within Australia, it’s clear that Australians 
might fund terrorism and instability overseas when they 
purchase drugs, especially because of the role played by some 
groups in the global drug trade. This engagement between 
organised crime and terrorism, while evolving and still not fully 
understood, has a clear capacity to harm Australia’s interests 
on a number of levels, including by increasing the direct level 
of danger to the Australian community and by affecting our 
international interests, as this report discusses below.
If they can, serious and organised criminals will bribe and 
corrupt political figures and officials to get their way. The 
reported level of public-sector corruption, and public 
perceptions of such corruption, in Australia seems low.54 
However, there have been instances of corrupt conduct at the 
local, state and national levels of government, some of them 
linked to serious and organised crime.55 Other examples of 
political corruption by organised criminals at the federal level 
remain conjecture at this stage, and this study is unable to add 
further clarity.56 However, according to experts interviewed 
for this project, it’s difficult to investigate corruption 
without specific powers, such as those given to state-level 
anticorruption commissions. But it’s also important to have 
the right kind of anticorruption mechanism, and there are 
many options to choose from.57 Still, if the Australian public is 
to be sure that corruption by organised criminals doesn’t exist 
in its government, more needs to be done in this area.
What potential harm can serious and organised 
crime create for Australia’s sovereignty?
• Compromise borders and biosecurity
• Increase border security costs
• Corrupt politicians and officials, with the potential 
to influence government institutions
Concerns for Australian citizens and investments overseas
Corruption and dealings with criminals by Australians 
outside Australia highlight the challenges posed by serious 
and organised crime to Australians living, investing and 
travelling overseas.
The Australian businesses interviewed for this project said 
that they tend to be careful when investing in a number 
of other countries, mainly out of concern about sovereign 
risk or criminal exploitation. The concern is well placed: 
Deloitte found that 35% of survey respondents who operate 
in high-risk jurisdictions have experienced a bribery and 
corruption incident in the past five years.58 This risk leads 
some businesses to establish arm’s-length ownership 
arrangements or put special measures in place to protect 
their employees. All of these arrangements have an effect on 
profitability, because these businesses need either to work 
with rent-seekers or reduce risk.
According to the World Bank, corruption adds about 10% 
to business costs globally and about 25% to procurement 
costs in developing countries.59 Corruption is also described 
as the ‘unutterable barrier to investment’ by the Asialink 
Commission, meaning that Australian (and other) firms 
may not be able to operate to their full potential in places 
where corruption is rife.60 In some cases, Australian firms 
pay bribes for protection or access. While organised crime 
isn’t always involved, economic and political penetration 
of some countries by such actors can directly affect profits 
and lead to Australians becoming criminals if they try to 
bribe governments.
Most Australians who travel overseas return without 
incident, but serious and organised crime might be a part 
of some itineraries. The links between organised crime 
and the sex trade are clear.61 Sex tourism can thus bring 
Australians into contact with criminal enterprises, and the 
actions of Australians can contribute to problems through 
those interactions including human trafficking and modern 
slavery.62 Kidnapping for ransom by criminal and terrorist 
groups is another real concern in many countries, including 
in our near neighbourhood. Also, Australians love to buy and 
import the counterfeit watches, DVDs and handbags—and 
drugs—that can be easily obtained abroad.63 In this respect, 
demand from tourists contributes to serious and organised 
crime, often in the very countries that receive aid and law 
enforcement support from Australia. While it’s difficult to 
determine the extent of the effect, this engagement with 
organised crime means that Australians contribute—to some 
degree—to problems that our government is trying to avoid 
or avert. Worse still, the harm occurs in countries that are 
often unable to cope adequately with rising social, health and 
law enforcement problems.
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What potential harm can serious and organised 
crime create for Australian investment and 
citizens overseas?
• Increased costs of transactions and risk
• Potential risks to personal safety
• Exposure of Australian businesses to situations in 
which bribery is very common
Political instability, reduced development and increased 
costs of trade and cooperation
According to Jeremy Douglas of the UN Office on Drugs and 
Crime, the impact of organised crime in our region could 
overshadow any benefits of future regional economic and 
social integration.64 That sober assessment means that 
Australian aid, public and private, might go to waste unless 
there’s effective action against serious and organised crime 
in the region. There’s also a real risk that our ability to 
promote our interests in international trade, cooperation and 
peace may be fundamentally compromised without attention 
to corruption—the great facilitator of organised crime. That’s 
because organised crime both affects governance overseas 
and provides permissive environments for criminals to 
launch operations into Australia.
Corruption has, until recently, been an often avoided topic in 
international affairs. While not always linked to serious and 
organised crime, it has economic, governance, human rights 
and security dimensions. That makes its effects wide-ranging 
and highly detrimental to Australian interests. Among other 
things, corruption reduces the ability of governments to act 
effectively, distorts decisions and misappropriates resources, 
and thoroughly compromises some governments.
This kind of penetration reduces the ability of governments 
to trust each other or cooperate in areas such as trade, 
investment and mutual legal assistance.
One reason why trust with our neighbours is essential 
for Australia is because criminal actors based outside 
our borders can severely hamper our national interests. 
The vast majority—around 70%—of the top serious and 
organised crime targets for Australian law enforcement are 
internationally linked, and many live offshore. They do so 
for many reasons, including because operating conditions 
are easier in places with poor governance, because some 
locations are close to illicit resources, and because the 
internet allows some to operate ‘remotely’. Organised 
criminals can therefore use some countries as havens to 
manage and perpetrate crime against Australia.
Australian concerns about crime overseas include more 
than just illicit goods crossing our border. For example, 
there’s a strong national interest in protecting values such 
as biodiversity, human rights, intellectual property and the 
rule of law. Organised crime harms those interests in many 
ways through practices such as wildlife smuggling, people 
smuggling and human trafficking. Intellectual property 
theft, notably today using the cyber domain, can also create 
mistrust between nations. 
Crime can directly affect regional conflicts, especially where 
groups oppose their governments or exploit power vacuums. 
Such groups can eventually pose dangers to our forces when 
the ADF and AFP are deployed on operations. Furthermore, 
organised criminals can help terrorist groups with funding 
and supplies, including in operations such as the 2002 Bali 
bombings, in which 88 Australians lost their lives.65 In other 
situations, terrorist groups use criminal activities to fund 
their actions. This means that serious and organised crime 
has a direct and serious impact on Australia’s interest in 
regional development and stability.
Lest we see ourselves as ‘victims’ only, we should recognise 
that the harms aren’t all inward-bound: there are instances 
of Australian criminals ‘exporting’ their operations offshore 
(Figure 7). The most notable have been Australian outlaw 
motorcycle gangs, which have been reported as active in 
a number of Southeast Asian and a couple of Pacific island 
states. On top of this, Australian paedophiles, who often 
fit the description of serious and organised crime, also 
actively degrade human rights and dignity and add to the 
region’s social problems.66 It’s also known that Australia is 
the destination country for some funds misappropriated 
from overseas.67 These factors make some Australians 
contributors to harm experienced by others.
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Figure 7:  Australia’s criminal exports
What potential harm can serious and organised 
crime create for regional stability, trust and trade?
• Heightened instability and ineffective governance 
in regional states
• Complications or harm to intergovernmental 
cooperation efforts and relations
• Harm to values such as biodiversity, the rule of 
law, human rights and intellectual property
• The provision of havens for criminals to operate 
from against Australia, and places for Australian 
criminals to operate offshore
• Costs for aid and interventions
Conclusions and key questions
It’s difficult to make an overall statement about the full 
extent of harm to Australia’s interests caused by serious 
and organised crime. That’s because harm is very hard to 
measure and the effect of serious and organised crime isn’t 
uniform. We have a clear picture of some harms, such as those 
from illicit drugs, but others are opaque, under-reported, 
under-researched and just plain hard to assess—cybercrime, 
fraud and corrupt activities fall into one or more of those 
categories. It can also be hard to measure the impact of 
‘enabling crimes’ such as identity fraud or firearms trafficking 
until the purpose of the initial crime is known.
Others are using quantitative methods and modelling to 
attempt to update estimates of the cost of serious and 
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organised crime to the Australian economy. This special 
report takes a different track by examining how serious and 
organised crime affects our interests—which are broader 
than just costs—here and overseas. Despite the identified 
uncertainties, this report’s qualitative explanation of the 
main harms meets the modest objective of encouraging 
discussion in Australia about serious and organised crime.
Still, this report—like the ACC’s publicly released report on 
the types of serious and organised crime in Australia and the 
2013 National Security Statement—doesn’t provide a way to 
distinguish the relative importance of harms to Australia’s 
interests. A further harm or risk assessment would be valuable 
because it isn’t useful to consider all harms as equal in their 
effect on the nation’s interests. Priorities are needed to ensure 
that scarce investment dollars for law enforcement capability, 
and indeed for operational activities, are targeted so they 
achieve the optimal return. That work must be held over for 
another time. So, while this report doesn’t provide the whole 
answer, it’s a good way to ask questions that the community, 
business and government should be interested in answering.
Three main conclusions can be drawn from the analysis 
above. First, public demand for organised crime’s products 
and services is a key driver of these complex and penetrating 
harms. While not everybody contributes, serious and 
organised crime is encouraged by Australians’ willingness to 
pay high prices for illicit drugs and counterfeits, save a few 
bob on something that ‘fell off the back of a truck’, accept ‘too 
good to be true’ deals, and take their demand for sex offshore. 
Those choices mean that some Australians and Australian 
businesses are key parts of illicit markets here and overseas, 
and so are key factors in creating markets for organised crime. 
They also mean that the harms from crime affect people’s 
lives in many ways, including by producing physical fear, 
poor economic outcomes and significant health problems. 
We need to agree that law enforcement isn’t the only policy 
tool available: social services, education, health and research 
should also be integrated into a truly whole-of-government 
response to serious and organised crime.
Second, like many dark activities, we don’t know the scale 
of corruption in Australia. Some evidence can be taken from 
surveys such as Deloitte’s and the Transparency International 
Perceptions Index, and the findings of state-level and law 
enforcement anticorruption agencies. For instance, the 
Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI), 
which oversees federal agencies involved in law enforcement 
and border security, had 45 ongoing investigations in 2013–14 
and recorded 11 convictions. We also have strong agencies 
able to investigate corruption, including a multi-agency Fraud 
and Anti-Corruption Centre in the AFP, various ombudsmen 
and Inspectors General, and the ACC. Still, there are strong 
views that federal politicians, courts, national business and 
non-law-enforcement public sector agencies do not receive 
enough scrutiny. There are many ways to increase the level of 
scrutiny, with options including a small committee reporting 
to parliament through to a ‘Federal ICAC’68, with the latter 
being quite controversial and potentially fraught. But any 
system would have drawbacks unless it’s well considered and 
appropriate for the situation. Choosing the right way to achieve 
the desired outcome—an environment hostile to corrupt public 
behaviour—is something that should be examined further.
Third, there’s still more to do to optimise Australia’s 
legislative, enforcement, international and preventive 
framework for countering serious and organised crime. 
While Australian governments do a lot already, aspects of 
our national approach to countering organised crime could 
receive additional attention. This might include:
• investing to develop uniformly high levels of law 
enforcement capability across Australia
• creating a nationally consistent framework for dealing 
with unexplained wealth (we’re likely to see some 
progress on this in the near future)
• improving the ability to use data held by the CrimTrac 
Agency for intelligence purposes (work on this 
is underway)
• extending some recent innovations in counterterrorism 
law to organised crime, including delayed notification 
warrants and passport management
• having the federal cabinet commission and endorse 
a white paper on law enforcement, which should be a 
precursor to a national conversation about our future law 
enforcement needs.
Of course, standing still isn’t an option. As organised crime 
structures and their markets change, Australia’s response will 
need to change. We should expect to see more penetration 
of legitimate markets, greater use of dark networks and 
cyberspace, and greater use of innovative technologies. 
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Disrupting international syndicates—for example, by making 
it harder to move money or by improving others’ ability to 
arrest them—will continue to be an important Australian 
priority. Since much of that activity will occur or be directed 
from overseas, international cooperation and information 
sharing will remain a critical enabler of our efforts and a 
contribution to others’.
To do more about the organisers of crime who live 
overseas, ASPI colleagues have identified other ideas, such 
as developing a national strategy to combat crimes by 
Australians abroad69 and creating long-term partnerships 
and capacity development plans for key countries such as 
Indonesia and Papua New Guinea.
Rather than making recommendations, this report concludes 
by asking some key questions about serious and organised 
crime. These questions could frame the future discussion 
or provide a starting point for further research into how 
the community, business and government can help law 
enforcement stay ahead of criminals. They’ll also help to 
shape the research agenda for ASPI’s Strategic Policing and 
Law Enforcement Program.
Questions for the community
Question 1: Do you care about the harm caused by serious 
organised crime?
The most important question for the community is about 
whether it’s sufficiently concerned about serious and 
organised crime to accept changes to deal with the problem. 
While Australians have had a long and detailed discussion 
about counterterrorism measures over the past year, there’s 
been no real discussion about whether they would be willing 
to accept additional laws and resource allocations to counter 
serious and organised crime. Our experience with terrorism 
shows that people will accept some restrictions as long as the 
need is explained and there’s oversight of the powers given 
to agencies.
Question 2: Do you understand where illicit goods and 
service come from?
This question is related to the first. The use of illicit goods 
and services will undoubtedly go on, but demand might be 
reduced by better information about the sources of such 
goods and services and the effect of serious and organised 
crime on other interests.
Question 3: Do you understand the criminal threat?
There’s a large amount of information available about 
criminals, especially their methods. Understanding some 
preventive measures, including some simple ones relating 
to cybersecurity, will help members of the public to prevent 
serious and organised crime from having an impact on them.
Question 4: Do you know about the available crime 
reporting tools?
It’s worth reminding the community about the range 
of ways they can report crime, including their ability to 
make anonymous reports. The most prominent are the 
National Security Hotline (1800 1234 00), the Australian 
Cybercrime Online Reporting Network (www.acorn.gov.au), 
Crimestoppers (1800 333 000) and the hotline for illegal 
online content (www.acma.gov.au/hotline).
Questions for business
Question 1: Is the level of government–business–
community information sharing about serious and 
organised crime optimal?
According to the small sample of businesses interviewed for 
this report, some seem to have trouble getting actionable 
information about criminal threats. That’s not the result 
of an ‘iron law’: the Australian Government has conducted 
‘trusted’ information sharing about terrorist threats 
with key infrastructure owners, and there are also some 
industry-specific arrangements for information sharing on 
crime and cyber threats. The ACC now has a broader ability 
to share information with business than it did previously. 
These arrangements are a good start and potentially a model 
for other industry groups to obtain better information about 
criminal threats and methods, assuming that this could 
be achieved on a trusted basis and that all legislative and 
cultural issues involving safety, security, privacy, fair trial and 
reputation can be satisfied.
Question 2: Does your peak body understand the criminal 
threats you face?
Discussions with a number of individual businesses and peak 
bodies showed that criminal threats aren’t always discussed. 
This can lead some businesses to fail to understand the 
‘organisation’ behind the noncompliance that they see. If 
peak bodies knew more about criminal threats to individual 
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members, they would be in a better place to engage 
governments about the problems faced by their industries.
Question 3: What’s the future of crime in your industry?
Changes in technology, value and geopolitics have significant 
effects on different industries and on the crimes that afflict 
each industry. Those at the forefront of product development 
are well placed to understand how criminals might see new 
markets in an industry, or where new value might be derived. 
Industries should be looking hard at this and discussing their 
findings with law enforcement agencies.
Question 4: Do you use crime reporting tools?
The reporting tools listed above can also help businesses.
Questions for government
Question 1: Are there further ways to integrate the 
Australian public and businesses through the national 
response plan against organised crime?
The newly released National Organised Crime Response Plan 
2015–18 provides some detail about how law enforcement 
agencies share information about serious and organised 
crime with businesses and the community. But the plan 
also acknowledges that ‘there are only a few initiatives 
that encourage a genuine dialogue between government 
and the community, or that actively seek information 
from the community about serious and organised crime 
behaviour.’70 It’s worth looking at existing mechanisms in 
other security-related areas, and investigating international 
examples of information sharing between governments and 
their communities, and considering which innovations might 
be applied in the serious and organised crime space.
Question 2: Is there a better way to describe the 
threat of organised crime to the Australian public than 
‘national security’?
Current official documents tend to describe serious and 
organised crime as a threat to national security. That’s 
justifiable, but protecting national security is perceived as a 
‘government’ job. Might it be better to use the formulation 
of personal, business and national interests to help make 
the concern more relevant to all Australians? That could 
broaden the scope to include such things as personal harms 
and losses to individual businesses. It could allow leaders 
to talk about the responsibility for combating organised 
crime in a more inclusive way than the ‘national security’ 
approach allows.
It may also be worthwhile to provide the parliament and 
public with an assessment of the relative harm caused by 
different kinds of serious and organised crime to support 
informed choices about law enforcement priorities. This 
should go beyond briefings provided to ministers and 
committees, and the existing information about threat, 
to include an assessment of the level of harm of each 
crime type.
Question 3: Are our current national approaches to 
serious and organised crime optimal?
Effective law enforcement is a priority for all Australian 
governments, but is the level of cooperation and cohesion 
across borders as good as it can be? Efforts to counter 
organised crime have been encouraged by real changes 
in intra- and interjurisdictional cooperation over the past 
decade, according to some well-placed interviewees. Still, 
there’s even more that can be done:
• We don’t have consistent nationwide law enforcement 
training and equipment to counter organised crime and, 
according to some experts, our law enforcement agencies 
need better capabilities to deal with cybercrime and 
economic crime.
• Some key professions sit outside our 
anti-money-laundering regime.
• Political leaders mostly remain focused on prosecuting 
and convicting serious and organised crime figures; they 
don’t place as much value on efforts to disrupt criminal 
operations and to reduce the harms from crime.
Moreover, many laws are nationally inconsistent or not 
considered relevant to the other levels of government. The 
most obvious problem has been the inability of all Australian 
governments to develop a truly nationally consistent 
framework to recover unexplained wealth from criminals. 
There’s movement on this, and a welcome but still partial 
solution is expected soon, but there are further opportunities 
to enhance the legislative framework to help undermine 
organised crime. Delayed notification warrants, which have 
been introduced as part of the counterterrorism effort, might 
be applied effectively to organised crime.
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It’s also time to think about demand for crime, as well as 
supply. Could we do more to understand the causes and 
explain the impacts of demand for criminal goods and 
services? Do governments really make it clear to their public 
that demand is a large part of the reason why illicit markets 
exist? Might it be time to have a national conversation 
about drug laws to determine whether all our current 
approaches are optimal? Are there better ways to integrate 
non-law-enforcement actors into the effort to counter 
organised crime?
Finally, can governments measure the performance of their 
law enforcement agencies—and resource them—on the basis 
of what doesn’t happen if the agencies’ focus is changed 
to harm minimisation and prevention (rather than arrests, 
response times and the like)?
Question 5: Are there more ways to enhance Australia’s 
international contribution to the fight against serious and 
organised crime?
Australia has a strong track record in capacity development 
in our region and in international groups, but could we do 
more where that’s in our interests? Capacity building to 
promote effective cooperation is one way to contribute, 
but we should also be examining our own systems. For 
example, is the overseas-based element of our strategic 
criminal intelligence network optimally organised, directed 
and resourced? We gain a lot from knowing what’s going 
on, and it’s good to see that the ACC is now expanding its 
overseas reach, but could we be even more effective? Also, 
interviewees for this project suggested that we could do 
more to improve coordination and real-time information 
sharing among our existing international law-enforcement 
cooperation network partners. Similarly, is there more we 
could do to share Australian knowledge about serious and 
organised crime trends, particularly in such areas as tax 
evasion, money laundering and terrorism financing? Can we 
learn from the experience of others, perhaps in areas such as 
cyber investigations?
Question 6: Do we have the best possible system to 
uncover and counter corruption?
While the glow around anticorruption bodies has dimmed 
a little, we need to separate the operation of particular 
agencies from the principle of anticorruption. Australia has 
good anticorruption instruments, as we’ve explained earlier. 
The Public Interest Disclosure Scheme is also important.
However, there’s strong view that oversight for politicians, 
for officials in many departments and for some parts of the 
business community is still wanting. Is another body needed? 
Should it have a narrow remit or a large one? Should it be a 
new organisation or one built by consolidating or expanding 
the remit and resources of others? Regardless of the answers, 
there’s a real need to ask and answer these questions if we 
want to make Australia an even more hostile place for serious 
and organised crime groups and activities.
Dismantling the web: a research agenda 
for ASPI’s Strategic Policing and Law 
Enforcement Program
The harms caused by organised crime to Australia’s interests 
are many and occur in different areas. They are interwoven 
by their criminal methods, impacts and implications for 
Australian interests. And the speed, reach and depth of 
criminal penetration are increasing as more take advantage 
of cyberspace to perpetrate organised crime.
There’s a clear relationship between transnational, serious 
and organised crime and many of ASPI’s other priority 
research areas, including border security, counterterrorism, 
cybersecurity and regional security. Allowing for that effort, 
the Strategic Policing and Law Enforcement Program will 
concentrate on the following key research areas:
• Australian policy and organisational responses 
to law enforcement challenges. In this strand, the 
program’s focus will be on current and proposed policy 
responses to serious and organised crime, encouraging 
the consideration of new options and challenges as 
they arise. Unexplained wealth, countering corruption 
and financial crime, and the Australian Government’s 
expectations for its law enforcement community will 
be priorities.
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• Information sharing between business, the 
community and law enforcement. The Serious and 
Organised Crime Response Plan 2015–18 notes the gap in 
this area. A study of how other countries have addressed 
the challenges of information sharing—and lessons for 
Australia—will be a major research task for ASPI in 2016.
• International law enforcement cooperation. The extent 
of offshore involvement in organised crime in Australia 
is well known, which makes it valuable to research the 
best ways to optimise intelligence sharing, build capacity 
in partners, participate in stability operations and share 
operational information. The program will also examine 
how Australia’s law enforcement agencies contribute 
to our international objectives, and ways to optimise 
that contribution.
• Geopolitical change. Political stability and instability 
are factors that change the sources of criminal goods, the 
routes taken by transnational criminals and the ‘havens’ 
used by them. The program will consider the interaction 
of globalisation with developing, failed or failing states 
to assess how this gives rise to opportunities for new 
transnational crime forms, routes and actors.
While Australia hasn’t experienced the same level of violence 
and corruption due to serious and organised crime as other 
countries, we can’t assume that’s only for a want of ambition 
on the part of criminals. If our law enforcement agencies 
weren’t as strong and competent as they are, and if our 
society as a whole weren’t as cohesive as it is, the threat 
posed by organised crime would surely be much greater. 
Nor can we be complacent or discount the harms from crime 
because they haven’t been quantified. Organised crime 
affects communities, hurts people directly and indirectly, and 
costs every Australian higher taxes and charges. Importantly, 
it also stops some Australian businesses from competing 
fairly. These factors mean that defeating organised crime is in 
everybody’s interest, and a topic that’s important to ASPI.
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